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Abstract
Although governments are developing and implementing policies to adapt to the impacts of climate change, 
it remains unclear which factors shape how states are developing these policies. This paper aims to assess 
whether or not administrative traditions matter for the formation of national climate change adaptation 
policy in 32 high-income countries. We operationalize administrative traditions based on five structural 
criteria: vertical dispersion of authority, horizontal coordination, interest mediation between state-society, 
role of public administrator, and how ideas enter bureaucracy. We construct a unique adaptation policy 
dataset that includes 32 high-income countries to test seven hypotheses. Our results indicate that countries’ 
adaptation policies align to some extent with their administrative structure, particularly dispersion of 
authority and horizontal coordination. However, we find limited evidence that other public bureaucracy 
factors are related to national adaptation policy. We conclude that administrative traditions matter, but 
that their influence should not be overestimated.
KEY WORDS: administrative traditions, climate change adaptation, governance, policy innovation, 
public  bureaucracy
行政传统对气候变化适应政策而言重要吗？一项关于32个高收入国家的比较分析
尽管政府正在制定并实行相关政策来适应气候变化影响，但目前尚不清楚的是，哪些因素会对国家
如何发展政策一事产生影响。本文致力评估32个高收入国家中行政传统是否会影响国家气候变化
适应政策的形成。作者基于5项结构性准则，对行政传统进行了操作化。这些准则分别是：权威的垂
直分散、横向协调、国家和社会间的利益调解、公共行政人员的作用、以及不同观念如何进入官僚。
作者建构了一个包含32个高收入国家的独特适应政策数据集，用于测试7项假设。测试结果显示，
各国的适应政策在一定程度上和各自的行政结构保持一致，尤其是权威分散和横向协调。然而，作
者发现，其他公共官僚机构因素和国家适应政策之间没有太多的相关性。本文结论认为，行政传统
固然重要，但它们的影响也不应被夸大。
关键词: 行政传统, 公共官僚机构, 气候变化适应, 治理, 政策创新
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¿Importan las tradiciones administrativas para la políticas de adaptación al 
cambio climático? Un análisis comparativo de 32 países de alto ingreso
A pesar de que los gobiernos estén desarrollando e implementando políticas para adaptarse a los impactos 
del cambio climático, no es todavía claro qué factores le dan forma a cómo los estados están desarrollando 
estas políticas. Este documento busca evaluar si las tradiciones administrativas importan al momento de 
formular las políticas nacionales de adaptación al cambio climático en 32 países de alto ingreso. 
Operacionalizamos las tradiciones administrativas basándonos en cinco criterios estructurales: la disper-
sión vertical de la autoridad, la coordinación horizontal, la mediación de intereses entre el estado y la 
sociedad, el papel que juega la administración pública y cómo las ideas entran en la burocracia. 
Construimos un set de datos único para las políticas de adaptación que incluye 32 países de alto ingreso 
para comprobar siete hipótesis. Nuestros resultados indican que las políticas de adaptación de los países 
están alineadas hasta cierto punto con su estructura administrativa, particularmente con la dispersión 
de la autoridad y con la coordinación horizontal. Sin embargo, encontramos evidencia limitada de que 
otros factores de la burocracia pública estén relacionados con la política de adaptación. Concluimos que 
las tradiciones administrativas importan, pero que su influencia no debería ser sobreestimada. 
PALABRAS CLAVE: tradiciones administrativas, burocracia pública, adaptación al cambio climático, 
gobernanza, innovación política
Introduction
States are increasingly pressured to respond to the crosscutting problems that require 
collective action, including climate change, global terrorism, food (in)security, and eco-
nomic crises (WEF, 2018). These societal problems pose considerable governing chal-
lenges, particularly as states are generally considered ill-equipped to deal with new and 
crosscutting issues. Of the many reasons why states struggle to tackle collective action 
problems, one of the prominent reasons is the way in which bureaucratic machineries 
work: in their basic form, they are contrived of highly specialized institutions and policies 
that favor particular ways of thinking and acting (Peters, 2015). Public bureaucracies 
have distinctive features that influence how policy goals are defined and which policy 
choice options exist, and set the implementation preferences of policy actors (Howlett, 
1991, 2004 ; Knill, 2001). These “administrative traditions” are the historically grown 
and relatively stable features of public bureaucracies that entail the particularities of 
how policy making and implementation are organized and acted upon by bureaucrats 
(Loughlin, Hendriks, & Lidström, 2010; Painter & Peters, 2010). Administrative tradi-
tions are entrenched in legal, administrative, and cultural institutions that have been (re)
shaped through reconfirmation of the civil servants’ activities (Dyson, 2010). While these 
traditions may gradually change over time in different contexts and for various reasons—
for example, in established democracies of Spain, Germany, and Belgium (Loughlin et 
al., 2010) and in many post-colonial and transition states (Painter & Peters, 2010)—they 
provide relatively stable features upon which bureaucracy is built (Peters, 2010).
The relative influence of administrative traditions and related concepts has been 
criticized in recent scholarship for lacking relevance in the rapidly changing network 
society of the twenty-first century. Key processes, it is argued, such as New Public 
Management, Europeanization and globalization, and neo-liberalization, are lead-
ing to convergence and increased similarity rather than differences in bureaucracies 
(Bennett, 1991; Drezner, 2001; Heichel, Pape, & Sommerer, 2005). Although this 
might be conditionally true, many studies show how structural and cultural differ-
ences still exist and matter for policy making, particularly when it comes to setting 
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preferences in the formation and implementation process around new policy issues 
(Meyer-Sahling & Yesilkagit, 2011). In situations of institutional voids and institu-
tion-building efforts, it is particularly important to assess the influence of administra-
tive traditions. This is especially pertinent when considering the possibility of poor 
alignment of new policies with existing institutions and administrative traditions, 
which could lead to high degrees of resistance to change in existing practices making 
it difficult to realize political ambitions (Bürzel, 1999; Falkner, 2005).
In this paper, we aim to empirically test whether administrative traditions are aligned 
with how states are adopting adaptation policies to respond to the impacts of climate 
change, focusing particularly on the structural dimensions of administrative traditions. 
Climate change adaptation is a novel policy issue that public bureaucracies and their 
administrative traditions are confronted with (Biesbroek, Peters, & Tosun, 2018). We 
make a clear distinction here between climate change mitigation, which refers to all 
(policy) efforts to reduce the emission of greenhouse gasses, and climate change adap-
tation—the focus of this paper—which refers to all (policy) efforts to reduce the neg-
ative impacts of climate change and/or take advantage of emerging opportunities. 
The role of bureaucracies in adaptation is critical to addressing the collective risk of 
climate change. This is a central argument underpinning the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change, in which adaptation was politically placed on equal footing with miti-
gation, committing governments to start or intensify their adaptation efforts across sec-
tors, levels, and societal groups (Lesnikowski et al., 2017; Magnan & Ribera, 2016). For 
over a decade, governments have been adapting to the projected impacts of climate 
change and many examples of adaptation policies, institutions, and instruments have 
been reported globally, including establishing interministerial climate change advisory 
committees, interdepartmental work programs, emergence of climate change minis-
tries, developing new laws and regulations to ensure integration of climate change 
adaptation, investments in new research and policy experiments, and many others 
(Bauer, Feichtinger, & Steurer, 2012; Biesbroek et al., 2010; EEA, 2014; Ford, Berrang-
Ford, & Paterson, 2011; Lesnikowski, Ford, Biesbroek, Berrang-Ford, & Heymann, 
2016; Massey, Biesbroek, Huitema, & Jordan, 2014). However, since data on adaptation 
policy remain scarce, we construct a unique dataset of 32 high-income countries to 
quantitatively assess how administrative traditions align with the adoption and imple-
mentation patterns of climate change adaptation policy. Such understanding will be 
vital to inform how states can progress in climate change adaptation policy.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the existing scholarly work 
on adaptation policy and administrative traditions, and formulates seven hypotheses 
stemming from the literatures. Then, we present the research design, empirical set-
ting, and methods of analysis. The results are presented in the fourth section followed 
by a discussion of the findings and implications.
Administrative Traditions and Climate Change Adaptation Policy
Some literature on adaptation policy suggests that there might be a link between 
how states respond to climate change risks and the socio-political and institutional 
context of a country. Vink et al. (2015) and Biesbroek (2014), for example, both 
show how the neo-corporatist traditions in the Netherlands and the British pluralist 
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traditions shape the different ways in which responsibilities between public and pri-
vate are divided, the types of policy instrument mixes proposed, which sectors are 
to be involved and in what way, and how adaptation policy is being decided and is 
implemented. Similarly, Granberg and Glover (2014) argue that the neoliberal polit-
ical ideology in Australia’s bureaucracy has shaped several explicit pathways through 
which adaptation policy is formulated and implemented, and in doing so poses 
structural constraints for looking at alternative policy options beyond this paradigm 
(Fieldman, 2011). These few small-n case-study examples give rise to broader ques-
tions about if and how elements of administrative traditions influence the adoption 
and implementation of climate change adaptation policy across different types of 
countries.
Understanding Climate Change Adaptation Policy
Different framings of what constitutes adaptation policy have left policy scholars 
struggling to define their dependent variable when comparing cases and scenarios. 
Here we follow Dupuis and Biesbroek (2013) and define adaptation policy as “... the 
production of outputs in forms of activities and decisions taken by purposeful public 
and private actors at different administrative levels and in different sectors, which 
deals intentionally with climate change impacts, and whose outcomes attempt to sub-
stantially impact actor groups, sectors, or geographical areas that are vulnerable to 
climate change” (p. 1480). In other words, we conceptualize something as adapta-
tion policy when it is explicitly framed as such by policy makers, an approach that is 
consistent with most other comparative adaptation policy studies (Araos et al., 2016; 
Austin et al., 2016). Given the multifaceted nature of adaptation, we unpack adap-
tation policy into three interrelated questions: 1) when is adaptation policy taking 
place (timing), 2) what kind of adaptation policy exists (action), and 3) how is this 
policy organized (structure).
Timing—Several studies have started to identify early adopters in adaptation policy 
and explore whether or not early adoption has resulted in measurably greater policy 
progress over time (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014). In Europe, Massey et al. (2014) 
find in their sample of 29 European countries that adaptation policy innovations 
are driven predominantly by extreme events and scientific evidence that climate 
change is happening. Patterns of policy diffusion clearly show early adopters (such 
as Finland, U.K., and the Netherlands), followers (such as Italy and Portugal), and 
many nonadopters. Similarly, Berrang-Ford et al. (2014) find in their dataset of 
117 countries that GDP per capita and good governance are the best predictors for 
whether or not a country starts to adapt and when this adaptation will take place.
Action—Several studies have made distinctions between “groundwork” actions 
and “concrete” actions (Biagini, Bierbaum, Stults, Dobardzic, & McNeeley, 2014; 
Lesnikowski et al., 2016). Much of the reported activity of governments is at the 
groundwork level: policy efforts to ensure high stakeholder involvement, investments 
in impacts, and vulnerability assessments and adaptation research as well as developing 
climate change scenarios. These activities are necessary first steps in order to move 
to more concrete adaptation policy, including dedicated financial schemes and 
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regulations, investments in infrastructure, public awareness and outreach campaigns 
as well as resource investments in organizational and staff development (Biagini 
et al., 2014; Lesnikowski et al., 2016). Although there are clearly leading countries 
that have moved well beyond groundwork actions, most are still at the groundwork 
stages and are experiencing considerable challenges moving toward implementing 
concrete adaptation actions.
Structure—Adaptation is not a policy goal that can be achieved, but rather a continuous 
process of change that all levels, sectors, and actor groups need to consider in their 
policy process. Many authors have argued that groundwork and concrete adaptation 
actions should be “integrated” or “mainstreamed” into existing policies and 
practices to be effective (Dovers & Hezri, 2010; Runhaar, Wilk, Persson, Uittenbroek, 
& Wamsler, 2017). How this implementation is organized, however, differs across 
states; some countries have opted for a strong institutionalization of adaptation 
from which mainstreaming is coordinated or the development of key principles 
to guide how adaptation will be addressed nationally (Massey & Huitema, 2015). 
Other countries, however, have argued that adaptation is a local responsibility and 
that no additional institutional structure is needed to ensure uptake of adaptation 
at the most appropriate level (Storbjörk & Uggla, 2015). Many scholars argue that 
horizontal and vertical coordination and integration is necessary to ensure that all 
actors and organizations take into account the adaptation actions of others (Urwin 
& Jordan, 2008).
Some countries have therefore started to implement hard and soft laws to ensure 
timing, action, and structure for climate change adaptation (McDonald, 2011), with 
the UK Climate Change Act from 2008 being the first adopted and most frequently 
highlighted in research (Jude et al., 2017). Legislative approaches have become more 
prominent, indicating increasing seriousness in addressing adaptation (Lesnikowski 
et al., 2016).
The Legacy Effect of Administrative Traditions: Five Structural Dimensions
The lack of a coherent definition for adaptation is also true for literature on admin-
istrative traditions. In most instances, literature uses broad heuristic categories of 
states that share similar administrative traditions (6, 2004). For example, Painter 
and Peters (2010) propose nine distinct families of countries that share similar-
ities in their administrative tradition: Anglo American, Napoleonic, Germanic, 
Scandinavian, Latin American, post-colonial South Asian and African, East Asian, 
Soviet, and Islamic. Similar classifications have been developed by others, including 
Loughlin et al.’s (2010) understanding of regional democracy in Europe. While there 
are merits to using these typologies, particularly for small-n and in-depth qualitative 
research, most contemporary states have hybrid forms of administrative traditions 
where combinations of the classical types of administrative traditions can be found 
(Painter & Peters, 2010). Though many dimensions of administrative traditions have 
been proposed, we limit the present study to the five main structural dimensions 
of administrative traditions dominant in the literature (see e.g., Freeman, 1985; 
Howlett, 2003; Knill, 1998, 2001; Painter & Peters, 2010):
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1 Vertical dispersion of authority
2 Horizontal coordination
3 Interest mediation between state−society
4 Role of public administrator: managerial or legalistic
5 How knowledge enters bureaucracy: Openness of public bureaucracy
Vertical Dispersion of Authority
The first dimension refers to the vertical dispersion of authority, in other words 
how power and responsibilities to implement adaptation policy are constitutionally 
defined and how they are retained and distributed between different levels of gov-
ernment (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). Dispersion of authority thus refers to the basic 
structures of the state by looking into unitary versus federalist states and centralized 
versus decentralized political systems, with many shades of gray in between (Dyson, 
2010). There is compelling theoretical—and empirical—evidence that the various 
ways of dispersing authority offer both advantages and disadvantages for governing 
complex issues. Federalist countries arguably have several advantages over unitary 
states as they are deemed to be more flexible and offer tailored policies, more effi-
cient provision of public services, and they allow for more diverse forms of policy inno-
vation and more extensive participation of societal actors in democracy. Rabe (2011), 
for example, argues that in the United States the subnational level has increasingly 
become the political level where policy innovations emerge, which supports local-
level adaptation policy, and resulting in a bottom-up process of building national 
adaptation policy (Fisher, 2013). However, federalist systems generally lack national 
coordination mechanisms, which create the risks of increased redundancy, incoher-
ency, and fragmentation across levels of government, and create unclear allocation 
of tasks and responsibilities. In decentralized systems, policy is thus expected go in 
different directions according to the specifics of the subnational state (Glicksman, 
2010). In centralized unitary systems, central government will decide what powers are 
given to local governments. In theory, these systems are more successful in internaliz-
ing negative externalities than the subnational level which faces more constraints in 
implementing policy due to the increased number of veto players and complex policy 
arenas. Unitary states are more likely to address key societal issues at the national 
level and coordinate within and across levels. In addition, the central government is 
expected to retain ultimate sovereignty on the issue even if authority is (temporarily) 
delegated to lower tiers of government, a trend which is visible in many (Western) 
democracies (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: Unitary centralized states are more likely to have dispersed authority on adaptation 
across scales in the form of coordinative mechanisms at the national level.
Horizontal Coordination
The second dimension refers to the inherent tension between specialization of 
bureaucracy and the need for coordination between different (sub)departments to 
set overarching goals, resources, and instruments, and to ensure distribution of issue 
attention to tackle crosscutting issues. Clearly specialized bureaucracies exist for 
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good reasons, but they have limited inter-ministerial linkages and capacities which 
makes collaboration across department less likely (Peters, 2015). The extensive body 
of literature on coordination and policy integration has evidenced the different tra-
ditions within countries to coordinate policy issues in response to NPM departmen-
talism (Peters, 2015), most notably Joined-Up Government, Holistic Government, 
and Whole-of-Government approaches, which are particularly prevalent in Anglo-
Saxon countries (Candel & Biesbroek, 2016; Tosun & Lang, 2017). How a country 
creates an institutional setting of decision routines and opportunity structures influ-
ences the ability of civil servants from different departments to collaborate more 
closely on (other) crosscutting issues such as food, smoking, and national security 
in more integrated ways (6, 2004). This can be, however, very specific for particular 
issues, as is illustrated by Newman and Head (2015) in the case of gun violence. The 
type of political system provides insights into the traditions of horizontal coordi-
nation in public bureaucracy; countries with consensus executive governments are 
characterized by political and decision-making structures where collaboration and 
coordination are key for political success (Lijphart, 2012). This is in contrast to more 
majoritarian executive systems where the minority can be decisive and one depart-
ment can dominate. We therefore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: States with collaborative administrative traditions are likely to have dedicated interde-
partmental coordination structures and instruments to address climate change adaptation holistically 
across sectors. 
Interest Mediation between State and Society
The third dimension of interest in this study is the relation between the state and 
other societal actors, an important but a difficult dimension to measure. The pat-
terns of interest mediation in most of the policy literature are classified into the 
two ideal-types of corporatist and pluralist patterns. In countries with high degrees 
of corporatism (e.g., Germanic) or corporate pluralism (e.g., Scandinavian), greater 
emphasis is placed on the organized interaction patterns within a limited number 
of organized societal interests, for example through labor unions, farmer organiza-
tions, or organized interests of specific industries (Peters, 2010). Close cooperation 
between state and society will be beneficial for collecting information, legitimiz-
ing government action, and strengthening “societal” engagement to ensure timely 
actions. The need for social partners in decision-making as well as lobbying of these 
interest groups for governmental actions is crucial when addressing new (environ-
mental) policy issues (Jahn, 1998; Siaroff, 1999). Politically elected decision-makers, 
and also  administrators, tune their policy proposals to organized interests through 
routinized interaction. In general, this specific system of interest intermediation is 
focused on cooperation rather than competition between societal interest groups, 
and therefore consensus through negotiation is essential (Schmitter, 1974). The 
strength of the different corporatism styles is their capacity to create consensus 
among strong conflicting societal interests and overcome controversy as well as creat-
ing stability and ability to cope with complex uncertain knowledge in plural societies 
(Visser & Hemerijck, 1997). Because of vested interests of (non)state actors in policy 
making, public bureaucracy may be more inclined to develop adaptation policy to 
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serve the public good and maintain trust. Boezeman, Vink, and Leroy (2015) show 
how corporatist approaches pacify political opposition by incorporating powerful 
societal organizations in an early stage of the policy-making process. We therefore 
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 3: Corporatist countries are expected to start adaptation at later stage than pluralist 
countries.
Although vested interests in corporatist styles can constrain policy development, 
corporatist mechanisms could also be used to prevent heated political debate or con-
troversy when policy proposals are to be accorded in parliament (Visser & Hemerijck, 
1997). However, the tradition of cooperation rather than competition among societal 
actors, iron triangles of closed interaction patterns, and the relative strong role of the 
state in corporatist styles is thought to make them slower in learning and innovation 
compared to more pluralist styles which centre on competition and societal plurality 
(Boezeman, Vink, Leroy, & Halffman, 2014; Vink et al., 2015). Given the conservative 
and relatively closed nature of corporatist states to include new policy actors and cre-
ate new institutions that compete for power, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: Corporatist states are more likely to mainstream adaptation into existing institutions 
rather thanestablish independent policy fields. 
Role of the Public Administrator: Managerial or Legalistic
Our fourth dimension reflects the institutions and culture within a bureaucratic sys-
tem that define the role of civil servants. Borrowing from Painter and Peters (2010), 
there are two meta-types of systems, more legalistic and more managerial systems 
(Christensen, Goerdel, & Nicholson-Crotty, 2011). Between these two extremes are 
for example Scandinavian countries that have a mixture of legalistic and managerial 
styles (Kickert, 2005). Managerial systems refer to administrations where civil servants 
are expected to serve the public good as efficient and effective as possible and focus 
on implementing policy programs. The civil servant is seen as the societal manager. 
The administrative practice can thus be very inductive, procedural, and mediating, 
with the Anglo-Saxon countries as prime examples of this style. Most of the policy 
instruments at the disposal of the manager are procedural in nature, altering the 
behavior of actors involved in policy implementation of goods and services delivered 
to the public as well as affecting the actions of citizens. Influence of New Public 
Management has driven civil servants into the direction of managers that facilitate 
efficient and effective implementation, but questions have been raised about less 
attention for accountability and discretionary issues that are central to public man-
agement (Hood & Margetts, 2007; Howlett, 2009). In legalistic systems, civil servants 
are mostly considered to be rule-following, and civil servants have a more substan-
tive character of regulatory activity to intervene in society (e.g., Germany). Mostly 
selected because of their legal training, civil servants in these systems are seen as 
guards of institutionalized democratic values in the administrative process. The 
rule of law is obviously the preferred instrument to ensure substantive policy imple-
mentation. Although legalistic systems can play an important role in facilitating and 
directing public management processes, the prevalent idea remains that law-based 
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public administrations are less open to include policy innovations that do not (yet) 
meet the institutionalized rules (Peters, 2010). Both systems have their pros and cons, 
particularly when it comes to the accountability mechanisms at the disposal to soci-
etal actors to appeal against the decisions of public administration; accountability 
is inward looking and part of the wider juridical systems in more legalistic systems, 
whereas the more open politics-driven forms of accountability systems follow from 
the more managerial systems (Kassel, 2008; Kettl, 2009). Bureaucracies that empha-
size legalistic approaches are expected to produce more severe barriers. We there-
fore hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5: Legalistic systems are less likely to adapt early.
And, we hypothesize that:
 Hypothesis 6: Managerial administrative systems are more likely to rely on procedural instruments to 
manage societal adaptation.
How Knowledge Enters Bureaucracy: Openness of Public Bureaucracy
Our final dimension refers to how new ideas enter public bureaucracy. This is a rele-
vant dimension given that ideas, knowledge, and evidence about how to adapt to cli-
mate change impacts need to enter and become part of bureaucracy. Controversial 
issues that are epistemologically distant from policy makers require scientific evi-
dence and (creative) ideas to make informed rational and legitimate decisions 
(Howlett & Newman, 2010), although acknowledging such evidence is often con-
tested. Halligan (1995) argues that such policy advice can emerge from within gov-
ernment, for example through the expert and professional public servants working 
within government, through the special political units in place, or through a spe-
cialized policy unit. Depending on the bureaucratic system, governments can exert 
influence by recruiting civil servants who are specialists in their respective fields or 
topics vis-à-vis bureaucracies where civil servants are mostly generalists and serve 
the public good (Demmke & Moilanen, 2010). The pluralistic knowledge societies 
in Western democracies have, however, other ways for policy advice to enter bureau-
cracy; different types of research agencies, scientific bodies and universities, think-
tanks, and consulting firms play a considerable role in advising government (Craft 
& Howlett, 2012), creating an “invisible public service” (Boston, 1994). Although 
such a relationship is much more difficult for governments to steer, several instru-
ments such as contracts, appointments, subsidies, and grants are used by govern-
ments to retain influence on policy advice. Clear differences are seen in the types 
of policy advisory systems, for example between Germany and the U.K. (Fleischer, 
2009). However, Craft and Howlett (2013) argue that policy advisory systems are as 
much about administrative structure as policy content, and specific contexts and 
jurisdictions result in specific advisory systems, thus according to the authors, the 
internal/external model by Halligan (1995) is not sufficient to understand the com-
plexities of contemporary systems. Policy advisory systems are thus an integral part 
of the boundary work between science and policy to address complex societal prob-
lems (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008; Hoppe & Wesselink, 2014). We therefore hypothe-
size that:
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Hypothesis 7: More open bureaucratic systems have a greater number of entry points for new ideas and 
so are likely to adopt policy innovations at an earlier stage.
Research Design, Data Collection, and Methods for Analysis
To date, no comprehensive dataset exists to test our hypotheses directly. We there-
fore combined information from different existing data sources to construct a novel 
dataset using available proxy variables to assess how administrative traditions align 
with national adaptation policy.
Datasets for Dependent Variables: Adaptation Policy
The key challenge for comparative work on climate change adaptation policy is find-
ing consistent, comparable, comprehensive, and coherent data, particularly because 
much of the conceptual and methodological work on this topic is still in early stages 
(Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). Three authoritative datasets are currently available on 
adaptation policy at the national level, and these were used here to construct our 
dataset. The original datasets are constructed of: self-reported adaptation activi-
ties through the UNFCCC National Communications 5 (~2010) and 6 (2012–2014) 
(Lesnikowski, Ford, Berrang-Ford, Barrera, & Heymann, 2013), self-assessment of 
EU Member States in response to the request of the European Environment Agency 
in 2013 (EEA, 2014), and an expert survey among scientists and policy experts from 
29 European countries in 2013 (Massey et al., 2014). The respective code-book and 
materials are available through the original sources. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the dependent variables used in this study.
Data on Independent Variables: Administrative Traditions
As there are no readily available datasets on administrative traditions, we made 
use of different data sources: the Comparative Political Data Set III (1960–2012) 
by Armingeon, Weisstanner, and Engler (2014); the OECD Government at Glance 
2013 report (OECD, 2013) and the OECD Government at Glance 2015 report 
(OECD, 2015); and the Quality of Government expert survey (1990−2012) by Teorell, 
Dahlström, and Dahlberg (2011). Of the many possible ways to conceptualize cor-
poratism (Siaroff, 1999) for hypotheses 3 and 4, we selected the Corporatism Index 
developed by Jahn (2014) as it best fitted our definition of state–society relationship 
described in the theory section. While these datasets often include a longitudinal 
dimension, this analysis provides a snapshot of the period 2010–2014, so the most 
recent data were selected for each variable, except the corporatism for which the 
calculated mean was used. Table 1 provides an overview of the independent variables 
used in this study.
Selection of Countries in Sample
This study included Annex I Member States of the United Nations Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC).1 Of the 43 UNFCCC Annex I Members States listed in 
2016, small nations and microstates (Liechtenstein, Monaco, Cyprus, Malta) as well 
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as the EU were excluded because they are not comparable in structure. Ukraine, 
Turkey, Croatia, and Russia were removed due to lack of data on both administra-
tive traditions and climate change adaptation policy. The final dataset included 32 
states.2 We excluded low- and middle-income countries because their administrative 
traditions are poorly theorized and relatively unstable (Jreisat, 2010), access to trust-
worthy data to measure public administration and climate change adaptation policy 
is limited, and the conceptualization of adaptation is likely to vary between Annex 
I and II countries, thereby complicating comparative analysis (Dupuis & Biesbroek, 
2013). It should be noted that 27 out of 32 are members of Europe(an Union) and the 
OECD. While this might influence individual member states on whether or not they 
start to adapt, the role of the EU and OECD has so far fulfilled merely an agenda 
 setting role. There are no formal competences by the EU in the formation and adop-
tion of climate change adaptation policy, nor was there a common global or European 
framework before 2014 that prescribes how countries should adapt (Biesbroek et al., 
Table 1. Overview of Dependent and Independent Variables and Sources Used in This Study
Independent variables
State structure [Continuous] Percent of GDP allocated to national government (2011) 
combined with categorization as unitary (-1) or federalist (1) structure. 
Source: OECD (2013); Armingeon et al. (2014)
Pluralism [Continuous] A proxy for Lijphart’s first dimension composed of moving 
10-year average for the number of effective parties in parliament, the 
absence of minimal winning and single-party majority cabinets, the 
proportionality of electoral systems, and cabinet dominance calculated 
by taking the average cabinet duration measured by the number of 
changes in government per year. Source: Armingeon et al. (2014)
Legalism [Continuous] Degree of legalism in bureaucratic style measured on a scale 
of 0–7, with higher scores corresponding to greater legalism. Source: 
Teorell et al. (2011)
Managerialism [Continuous] Degree of managerialism in bureaucratic style measured on a 
scale of 0–7, with higher scores corresponding to greater managerial-
ism. Source: Teorell et al. (2011)
Corporatism [Continuous] Trend in corporatist arrangements between state and society. 
Higher scores correspond to greater degrees of corporatism. Source: 
Jahn (2014). Calculated mean.
Closedness [Continuous] Extent to which administration is open to public scrutiny. 
Higher values mean a more closed administration. Source: Teorell et al. 
(2011)
Dependent variables
National coordination [Dichotomous] Is there a NAP/NAS in place (1: yes, 0: no). Source: 
Lesnikowski et al. (2016); Massey et al. (2014)
Horizontal coordination [Dichotomous] Is there a national working group or cross-ministerial 
committee (1: yes, 0: no). Source: Lesnikowski et al. (2015); Massey et al. 
(2014)
National legal framework [Dichotomous] Is there national CCA regulation (1: yes, 0: no). Source: 
Lesnikowski et al. (2016); Massey et al. (2014)
Implementation mode [Continuous] Share of adaptation initiatives reported in the Sixth National 
Communications that are implemented by mainstreaming. Source: 
Lesnikowski et al. (2016)
Proceduralism [Continuous] Share of all initiatives reported in the Sixth National 
Communications that are at the groundwork stage (including: climate 
change scenarios, impact and vulnerability assessments, adaptation 
research, stakeholder networking, conceptual tools). Source: 
Lesnikowski et al. (2016)
Timing [Continuous] Year of initial national adaptation plan or strategy enactment. 
Source: Lesnikowski et al. (2016); Massey et al. (2014)
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2010; CEC, 2013; EEA, 2014). Therefore, it is unlikely that there is a direct influence 
of the EU or OECD on how adaptation policy of member states is taking place.
Control Variables and Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis was conducted for GDP and the political orientation of govern-
ments as of the most recent election in 2012, as previous studies have shown that 
these are influential. Berrang-Ford et al. (2014) show that GDP per capita is strongly 
correlated to adaptation policy progress of countries globally. The GDP control vari-
able is therefore used at the beginning of the time period for which the dependent 
variable is available. We use the OECD database as the source of GDP data (OECD, 
2015). We also control for the political party in power for the past 5 years. Research 
suggests that countries with left-wing parliaments are more likely to formulate policy 
and implement adaptation actions compared to right-wing parties, which instead will 
place emphasis on mitigation and role of private actors to address climate change 
risks (Dupuis & Knoepfel, 2011). We would expect high variations in left–right orien-
tation of a government to have a direct influence on the absolute amount of policy 
outputs (Schmidt, 1996). We used the Comparative Political Data Set III to control 
for political orientation (Armingeon et al., 2014).
Method of Analysis
Based on the variables presented in Table 1—reflecting the best available proxies 
for our hypotheses—we constructed models to empirically test our hypotheses. 
Logistic and linear regression analyses were used to evaluate the statistical associa-
tions between five aspects of state structure and administrative traditions, and the 
presence of national adaptation efforts in 32 medium- and high-income countries. 
We built multivariable regression models for each of the six dependent variables in 
our dataset. The hypotheses and models are presented in Table 2.
In each model, we included any independent variables hypothesized to be associ-
ated with the dependent variable. We used multivariable models to allow consider-
ation of confounding and interaction between variables, where feasible, though our 
relatively small sample size precluded inclusion of more than one or two variables 
or consideration of interaction in a single model without compromising model reli-
ability. For continuous dependent variables (implementation mode, proceduralism, 
and timing), we used least squares regression; we used exact logistic regression for 
our dichotomous outcomes (national coordination, horizontal coordination, and 
national legal framework). We chose exact logistic regression due to the relatively 
small sample size of our dataset. Our modeling procedure was guided by our hypoth-
eses. We first constructed core models combining each dependent and independent 
variable combination that best proxied our hypotheses. For each model, we con-
ducted sensitivity analyses on each independent variable by including GDP and/or 
political preference variables to assess the extent to which the significance, strength, 
and/or direction of the independent variable effects were impacted. Model AIC (for 
linear; lower values indicate better model fit) and model score (for exact logistic; 
higher values indicate better model fit) were used to assess model performance. Prior 
to modeling, we assessed variables based on model assumptions, including linearity 
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and normality. GDP was highly overdispersed, and we thus used a dichotomous GDP 
variable (0=below median GDP, 1=above median GDP) for sensitivity analyses. We 
assessed all models for significant outliers. All analyses were conducted in Stata 
(StataCorp v.13).
Limitations of This Study
There are some limitations in the data and our methods of analysis. First, given 
that two sources rely on self-reporting, there might be a bias in the types of activi-
ties reported and emphasis on positive policy outcomes rather than policy failures. 
Many authors acknowledge that it is conceptually difficult to distinguish symbolic 
policies from concrete adaptation outputs in these datasets, which hampers large-
scale comparisons (Dupuis & Biesbroek, 2013). However, this is the best available 
data to date and more refined forms of adaptation tracking are needed to create 
better metrics for adaptation and allow for detail comparative assessments (Ford, 
Berrang-Ford, Lesnikowski, Barrera, & Heymann, 2013). Second, the datasets 
used are combinations of ordinal and categorical variables, which makes it com-
plicated to test very refined propositions. Variables treated as continuous in our 
analyses were in fact continuous constructs, but measured as multiple-category 
ordinal variables, thus reducing precision and statistical power in our analyses. 
Comprehensive data for some of our theory-informed hypotheses were nonexis-
tent, forcing us to use imperfect proxy variables. Third, our sample size is lim-
ited due to various reasons discussed above. This has implications for the tests 
used as well as robustness of our findings. Fourth and finally, we had to work with 
poor-quality data and limited sample size, which reduced reliability and validity 
of our findings and made it difficult to say with confidence whether or not these 
variables matter. We thus interpret our results with caution and focus on the stabil-
ity, reliability, direction, and relative strength of different effects rather than the 
precision of estimates. We reflect on the implications for interpreting our findings 
in the discussion section.
Results
Model Group A: Effect of State Structure on National Adaptation Plans
Consistent with our hypothesis 1, countries with a more unitary state struc-
ture were more likely to have National Adaptation Plan or National Adaptation 
Strategy (NAS/NAP) in place; this association was significant at p<0.05, though 
there was a wide confidence interval around the size of effect (Table 3). This 
effect remained similar when controlling for GDP, with a modest reduction in 
effective size and loss of significance. This implies that some of the association 
between state structure and NAP may be attributed to GDP, though the confound-
ing effect is modest (e.g., Table 3, Model 1 versus 2). We were not able to model 
the impact of political preference given the small sample size and nonconver-
gence of the model.
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Model Group B: Effect of State Structure and Pluralism on National Working Group
Federalist countries were significantly more likely to have a national working group 
on adaptation (Table 4, Model 1), which is the opposite of what we expected in hypoth-
esis 2. We found no evidence for the second hypothesis that more pluralist coun-
tries are more likely to have a national working group (Table 4, Model 2). Indeed, 
less pluralistic countries had national working groups more frequently than more 
pluralistic countries in most of our models (3 of 4), though the direction of effect 
was inconsistent and not significant in any models. Notably, we found an interac-
tion between pluralism and state structure. The effect of state structure on national 
working group was substantially stronger among less pluralistic countries (stratified 
models not shown). This can be observed in Table 4 in the difference in the effect of 
state structure between models 1 (without pluralism) and 3 (with pluralism), and the 
significance of state structure when pluralism is added to the model (Model 3): when 
accounting for pluralism, the effect of state structure on working group increased, 
though confidence intervals were very wide for state structure across all models. For 
example, of nine countries without national working groups, only one is federalist 
(Belgium), and the remainder unitary. Similarly, all federalist, less pluralistic coun-
tries in our dataset had national working groups (Spain, Canada, Germany, and the 
United States). Countries without national working groups were predominantly uni-
tary and close to the median pluralism score, with the exclusion of Belgium. These 
trends can be seen in Figure 1. Thus, while pluralism itself does not seem to have a 
substantial effect on national working group, it may be mediating the extent to which 
state structure matters for creation of a working group. The very large coefficient for 
state structure in Model 3 reflects the importance of pluralism in affecting the role 
of state structure on national working group, but should not be interpreted with pre-
cision given a very wide confidence interval.
Our sensitivity analyses of GDP and political preference indicate that neither vari-
able had a substantial influence for these models. There is evidence of weak con-
founding by GDP on the effect of state structure on creation of a national working 
group (Model 4). Wealthier countries are more federalist and are more likely to 
create working groups (results not shown); national wealth (or country size) rather 
than federalism may thus play a role in influencing the creation of national working 
Table 3. Model Group A
Core Model Sensitivity Analyses
Dependent variable: 
National adaptation 
plan
Independent
Variables:
Model 1
State structure only
Model 2
State structure, controlling 
for GDP
Model 3
State structure, controlling for 
political preference
State structure 
(more unitary)
10.02 (0.98-179.26)** 8.50 (0.45-269.92) n/a
GDP 1.31 (0.07-15.55)*
Political preference
Model score 3.58 3.61
Note:  Values in table represent odds ratio (95% CI) from exact logistic regression
** Significant at p < 0.05 (values in bold)
* Significant at p < 0.10 (values in bold)
896  Robbert Biesbroek et al. 
T
ab
le
 4
. 
M
od
el
 G
ro
up
 B
C
o
re
 M
o
d
el
s
S
en
si
ti
vi
ty
 A
n
al
ys
es
D
ep
en
de
n
t 
va
ri
ab
le
: 
N
at
io
n
al
 
w
or
ki
n
g 
gr
ou
p
In
de
pe
n
de
n
t
Va
ri
ab
le
s:
M
od
el
 1
St
at
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
on
ly
M
od
el
 2
Pl
u
ra
li
sm
 o
n
ly
M
od
el
 3
St
at
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
+ 
Pl
ur
al
is
m
M
od
el
 4
St
at
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
co
n
-
tr
ol
lin
g 
fo
r 
G
D
P
M
od
el
 5
St
at
e 
st
ru
ct
ur
e,
 
co
n
-
tr
ol
lin
g 
fo
r 
po
lit
ic
al
 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
M
od
el
 6
Pl
ur
al
is
m
, c
on
tr
ol
lin
g 
fo
r 
G
D
P
M
od
el
 7
Pl
ur
al
is
m
, c
on
tr
ol
lin
g  
fo
r 
po
lit
ic
al
 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
St
at
e 
st
ru
ct
u
re
 (
m
or
e 
u
n
it
ar
y)
6.
62
 (
0.
74
-9
4.
35
)*
29
.8
2 
(1
.1
5
-5
86
2.
04
)*
*
4.
52
 (
0.
28
-1
11
.5
2)
3.
98
 (
0.
59
-4
8.
70
)
Pl
u
ra
li
sm
0.
82
 (
0.
40
-1
.6
5)
1.
38
 (
0.
16
-1
7.
73
)
0.
86
 (
0.
41
-1
.8
0)
0.
77
 (
0.
36
-1
.6
1)
G
D
P
1.
75
 (
0.
08
-7
9.
31
))
2.
39
 (
0.
47
-1
4.
14
)
1.
49
 (
0.
27
-9
.0
3)
Po
lit
ic
al
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
1.
01
 (
0.
96
-1
.0
9)
M
od
el
 s
co
re
2.
69
0.
31
4.
38
2.
85
2.
20
1.
83
0.
61
N
ot
e:
  V
al
u
es
 in
 t
ab
le
 r
ep
re
se
n
t o
d
d
s 
ra
ti
o 
(9
5%
 C
I)
 f
ro
m
 e
xa
ct
 lo
gi
st
ic
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
**
 S
ig
n
if
ic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
.0
5 
(v
al
u
es
 in
 b
ol
d)
* 
Si
gn
if
ic
an
t a
t p
 <
 0
.1
0 
(v
al
u
es
 in
 b
ol
d)
Do Administrative Traditions Matter for Climate Change Adaptation Policy?  897
groups. The sample size was insufficient to model more than two variables at a time 
with robust results.
Model Group C: Effect of Corporatism on Implementation Mode
We found no evidence—or indeed signals in the data—to indicate that more corpo-
ratist states have a greater share of adaptation initiatives that are implemented via 
mainstreaming (hypothesis 4) (results not shown). This was unaffected by GDP or 
political preference. Of the six most corporatist states (Germany, Austria, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden), for example, all but two (the Netherlands, Norway) 
mainstreamed adaptations at proportions below the median for the full dataset. 
Similarly, half of the six least corporatist countries (the United States, Canada, the 
U.K., Malta, Estonia, Poland) had mainstreaming levels above the median (Canada, 
Estonia, Poland).
Model Group D: Effect of Legalism, Corporatism, and Closedness on Timing of NAP 
Initiation
We found no evidence of significant relationships between corporatism (hypothesis 
3), legalism (hypothesis 5), closedness (hypothesis 7), and on the timing of NAP 
implementation. Our sample size was low for these analyses (n=20), and we were thus 
underpowered to detect significance for these variables; no coefficients in this model 
group were significant at the 95% confidence level. The strongest (though not signif-
icant) signal of potential effect was found for legalism. In contrast to our hypothesis 
5, countries with more legalistic systems implemented initial adaptation plans earlier 
Figure 1. Nations With and Without National Working Groups, By State Structure and Pluralism 
Note: the figure is a descriptive/scatterplot visualization of countries by pluralism, state structure, and national working group, and 
is not based on model results from Table 4
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than less legalistic countries. Among the four nations implementing NAPs earliest 
(Finland, France, Spain, and the Netherlands), all but one (Spain) are highly legal-
istic. Similarly, among the nations implementing NAPs the latest (Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia), all are less legalistic. This pattern appears to be partly confounded by GDP, 
however, with wealthier countries typically more legalistic and enacting NAPs earlier. 
Political preference had minimal impact on this trend. There were no signals in the 
data of a significant or potential effect of closedness or corporatism on the timing of 
NAP initiation (Table 5).
Model Group E: Effect of Managerialism on Proceduralism
We found no evidence to support hypothesis 6 that countries with more managerial 
systems had a greater proportion of initiatives in the NC6’s at the groundwork stage 
(results not shown). Across all models, managerialism was not a significant predictor 
of our procedural outcome, effect sizes were negligible, and in fact managerialism 
was consistently a poorer predictor than the null model. Models controlling for GDP 
and political preference did not affect these results.
Do Administrative Traditions Matter for Adaptation Policy?
Governments throughout the world have started to adapt to the impacts of climate 
change in a variety of different ways. Some literature has suggested that the ways 
through which governments are adapting might be influenced by the administrative 
traditions of these governments, or at least hinted that state structure matters. In this 
paper, we examined these observations by quantitatively testing the influence of five 
dimensions of administrative traditions on the formulation and adoption of climate 
change adaptation policy for 32 high and middle-income countries.
Our findings suggest that countries tend to implement adaptation policies and 
instruments that align to their state and administrative structures: national coordina-
tion, horizontal coordination, and state structure were associated with how govern-
ments structure their adaptation policies, organize their state–society relationship, 
and coordinate within and between levels of government. However, our findings 
are not overwhelming. Quite the opposite of what we hypothesized, we found that 
federalist countries are significantly more engaged in cross-departmental coordina-
tion compared to unitary states. This could be explained by studies which emphasize 
the important role for governments on the need for collective action across levels 
and the need for national governments to create an enabling policy environment 
for lower tiers of government to start adapting (Amundsen, Berglund, & Westskog, 
2010; Henstra, 2017; Steurer & Clar, 2018). It also shows the importance of climate 
change at national political levels, and awareness of the disadvantages of uncoor-
dinated action for adaptation. Our findings also provide preliminary support for 
the proposition that countries with legalistic traditions are more likely to use legal 
instruments to design and implement adaptation policies. Although the call for more 
legal approaches to adaptation is advocated by many scholars (Craig, 2010), and an 
increase is observed globally (Lesnikowski et al., 2016), our findings suggest that 
it can be questioned if such approaches would actually work (or be feasible) in all 
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contexts given the particularities of how for example governments with a more mana-
gerial style approach crosscutting issues in general, and climate change adaptation in 
particular. Surprisingly—and in contrast to most ideas in administrative tradition the-
ories—we found evidence that legalistic countries may actually start adapting earlier. 
This result was consistent even when controlling for GDP and political preference, 
and suggests that in some contexts legalism may not be a barrier to adaptation per 
se as most of the literature suggests (Biesbroek et al., 2013). In fact, compliance to 
inter- and supra-national agreements might actually be a driver for these countries 
to implement adaptation policies. As for timing of adaptation, previous studies have 
suggested that multiple drivers for policy development exist, including experience 
of extreme events, GDP, impact of supranational policies (Berrang-Ford et al., 2014; 
Massey et al., 2014). There was no evidence in our data that administrative traditions 
played an important role in the timing of adaptation, other than for legalism.
We found no evidence that societal organization and systems of interest interme-
diation between state and society (pluralism and corporatism) as well as public man-
agement variables (openness of bureaucracy, managerialism) played an important 
role in climate change adaptation policy. There are several possible explanations of 
why we found no evidence for these. First, it might simply be that these variables do 
not matter for climate change adaptation policy, or at least not the adaptation policy 
variables included in this study. Second, it might be that it is too early to tell whether 
or not these variables actually matter. Many of the few forerunner countries exist-
ing are pioneering and experimenting with climate change adaptation policies. The 
learning curve is steep for most of them. Most countries are still at the early stages 
of developing adaptation policies and it might simply be a matter of time before suf-
ficient progress has been made to assess influence of these variables on adaptation 
policy globally. Third, it might be that our operationalization of these variables does 
not sufficiently capture the complex and often composite processes in a meaningful 
way. More nuanced conceptualization as well as useful data on both dependent and 
independent variables would be needed to address this issue. We are thus careful in 
placing too much emphasis on the findings in this study as there remain limitations in 
both the quality and reliability of the data as well as conceptualization of the depen-
dent and independent variables. Our results should thus be considered heuristic and 
hypothesis-building, intended to guide future work.
With evidence providing support for only two out of seven hypotheses in this study, 
our results could suggest that administrative traditions are of little significance. Are 
states emerging as products of an increasingly globalized society, over time transition-
ing to an amalgamation of different administrative traditions? Our analysis evokes 
a longstanding debate in the political sciences about whether the characteristics 
of a problem—and its associated policy style—are more important in explaining 
cross-country variation policy adoption and implementation than administrative tra-
ditions, as suggested by, amongst others, the works of Freeman (1985) and Richardson 
(2014). This paper does not reconcile that debate, but instead adds a layer of com-
plexity by arguing that managing climate change impacts is by no means confined to 
merely one or a few policy sectors with its distinct sectoral policy style. In many cases, 
it is probably too early to tell to whether or not a policy field around climate change 
adaptation has emerged (but see Massey & Huitema, 2015) and how this is coordi-
nated with other sectors. However, as a next step, it would be worthwhile to explore 
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further how governments deal with different types of new emerging issues that cross-
cut existing policy systems, such as food insecurity and terrorism, and to what extent 
administrative traditions matter.
The behavioral dimension of administrative traditions as discussed in Biesbroek 
et al. (2018) could point toward an alternative understanding of why we could find 
evidence (or even signals in several cases) for only two out of seven hypotheses. It is 
clear that civil servants working in the climate change field have particular choices 
and preferences in the ways in which they select and give meaning to particular insti-
tutional conditions. This has not been included in our study and to better understand 
what the influence of administrative traditions is versus agency-based explanations 
that stress the role of leadership, policy entrepreneurship, or framing in climate 
change adaptation policy requires more systematic studies, see for example Rahman 
and Tosun (2018).
Finally, our results echo the calls for data that are more comparable, consistent, com-
prehensive, and coherent to allow for better comparative studies, not only at national 
level (Ford et al., 2015), but also at city level (Araos et al., 2016; Castán Broto & Bulkeley, 
2013). This quest for data is not limited to academic purposes only, but also relevant for 
the growing needs for informing policy advice and strengthening public accountability 
and transparency on climate policy. Unlike climate change mitigation, there are no 
mandatory and standardized reporting obligations that are of sufficient detail to assess 
and evaluate whether countries are making progress (or not), and what could possibly 
explain the observed changes. These questions are particularly timely given the post-
Paris agreement, where more emphasis is placed on the tasks and responsibilities of 
governments to invest in, develop, and implement adaptation policies.
It is of course difficult to conclude to what extent administrative traditions truly 
matter, particularly given the many other factors that shape adaptation policy. Whilst 
our findings are certainly not definitive, they do suggest that better understanding of 
the different variables that we found to be relevant will be of importance to consider 
when designing new adaptation policy innovations. This means, for example, that 
exchanging lessons learned across countries and adopting best adaptation practices 
should be selected, translated, and/or mainstreamed by taking into consideration 
the administrative structure of the country (Howlett, 2017). Moreover, supranational 
organizations such as the EU should prevent prescribing certain ways of working on 
adaptation policy (i.e., legalistic or managerial), as this is unlikely to lead to success-
ful adoption, but merely increases the chances of symbolic action by member states. 
Overall, our results encourage further reflections about the existence of “adminis-
trative fit” for climate change adaptation, particularly in the emerging polycentric 
regime on adaptation.
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